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SECURITIZING AMERICAN JUSTICE
In a world of scarcity, governments must balance their limited resources
with their unlimited wants.1 The rational governmental actor seeks to
maximize societies’ utility by efficiently and effectively deploying its scarce
resources.2 To achieve this objective, governments often hire the private sector
to provide goods and services.3 The belief behind this move is that the private
sector may be more effective at allocating these scarce resources than the
public sector.4
A relatively new scheme that appears to meet this criteria is the publicprivate partnership (“PPP”).5 The PPP is a securitization vehicle used by
governments to raise capital from private investors.6 This method allows
governments to create a net-positive social and economic benefit to society
because governments can provide a much needed infrastructure project (a
social benefit) while simultaneously encouraging private investment.7 While
securitization can be an effective means to raise money for critical
infrastructure projects, the potential to securitize key components of the justice
system threatens to impose significant social costs. Not only does it run the
risk of failing to meet short-term public policy objectives, such as reducing
prison costs, overcrowding, and recidivism, but it also may undercut societies’
perception of an effective justice system. Citizens’ distrust of the justice
system can have real social and economic costs: one need only look to the riots
in Ferguson, Missouri (2014), and Baltimore, Maryland (2015).8

1

Scarcity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/scarcity.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
Id.
3 Andrea Louise Campbell & Kimberly J. Morgan, Using the Private Sector to Deliver Public Benefits,
SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (May, 2012), https://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/
ssn_key_findings_morgan_campbell_on_delegated_welfare_state.pdf.
4 Id.
5 MICHEL FLEURIET, INVESTMENT BANKING EXPLAINED: AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INDUSTRY 1040
(McGraw-Hill eds., 2008).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See Alan Blinder & Mitch Smith, State of Emergency in Ferguson Is Lifted as Protests Ease, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/us/state-of-emergency-in-ferguson-is-lifted-asprotests-ease.html; Joshua Berlinger, Baltimore Riots: A Timeline, CNN (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:08 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/27/us/baltimore-riots-timeline/.
2
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I. PPP CASE STUDY- BENEFICIAL OUTCOMES OF SECURITIZING
GOVERNMENT ASSETS
The overhaul of the Chicago Skyway Toll Road (“CSTR”) is a prime
example of how securitizing a government asset can maximize social utility.9
In 2005, Chicago hired Goldman Sachs to help the city raise $1.8 billion
dollars to rebuild the then-dilapidated CSTR.10 Based on Goldmans’ advice,
Chicago determined that the best method to fund the project was to sell debtinstruments backed by future revenue generated from the CSTR.11 In other
words, Chicago looked to securitize the CSTR to attract private investment.12
To do this, Chicago and Goldman entered into a PPP.13 The City of Chicago
then sold Goldman a 99-year lease to own & operate the CSTR.14 In turn,
Goldman created a special purpose entity (“SPE”) to sell institutional investors
long-term debt backed by future toll revenue generated from the CSTR.15 The
sale of these asset-backed bonds generated approximately $1.4 billion dollars
to fund the project.16 By purchasing bonds issued to build the CSTR, investors
bore the cost of the project.17 However, their investments were secured by the
future toll revenue from the CSTR.18 At the other end, Chicago was able to
provide the public with a much needed infrastructure project without risking
taxpayer money.19
Securitization of the CSTR project was largely successful because the
project generated a net-positive social and economic benefit: it provided
Chicago with a desperately needed infrastructure while spurring industry and
investment.20 When this type of financing is used to fund infrastructure
projects, it can clearly produce a positive social and economic benefit.
However, this strategy may not produce such benefit when used in the legal
system. This can be determined from looking at how private investment in the
criminal justice system and lawsuit funding has fallen short of reaching public
9

Fleuriet, supra note 5.
Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Project Profiles: Chicago Skyway, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
ipd/project_profiles/il_chicago_skyway.aspx.
15 Fleuriet, supra note 5, at 1051.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1040.
10
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policy objectives. Specifically, it has failed to reduce prison costs, recidivism,
overcrowding, and improved access to justice. More broadly, it has discredited
the justice system as a whole.21
II. PRIVATIZING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Private entities currently own or operate various prisons, provide probation
services, and underwrite bail bonds.22 Third-party investors fund class action
lawsuits in order to gain a stake in damage awards. Failure of these entities to
achieve the socially desired results is the product of a misalignment of private
and public interest. Introducing securitization will only further complicate the
matter.
In the criminal justice system, privatization was a promising tool meant to
cut prison operating costs, alleviate inmate overcrowding, and reduce
recidivism.23 In 2010, a study found that forty states spent a total of $39 billion
on their prison systems for the fiscal year.24 This money was spent on the six
million individuals under “correctional supervisions.”25 PPPs were set up to
allow private enterprises to finance, design, build, and operate correction
facilities and services.26 It was believed that the private sector would compete
for these lucrative government contracts by offering competitive prices and
high quality services.27 Geo Group, Inc. and American Corrections Corp. of
America are two publicly traded companies that were created to profit off of
prison privatization.28 The problem with these PPPs, was that Federal and State
21

Infra Part III.
See Banking on Bondage: Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration: Executive Summary, ACLU (Nov.,
2011), https://www.aclu.org/banking-bondage-private-prisons-and-mass-incarceration; Private Probation: A
Juicy Secret, ECONOMIST: DEMOCRACY IN AM. (Apr. 22, 2014, 9:29 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
democracyinamerica/2014/04/private-probation; Adam Liptak, Illegal Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in the
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/us/29bail.html?_r=0.
23 See Dana Joel, A Guide to Prison Privatization, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 24, 1988),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1988/05/bg650-a-guide-to-prison-privatization.
24 Christain Henrichson & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Prisons: What Incarceration Costs Taxpayers,
VERA INST. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.vera.org/pubs/special/price-prisons-what-incarceration-coststaxpayers.
25 John W. Whitehead, Jailing Americans for Profit: The Rise of the Prison Industrial Complex,
HUFFINGTON POST: CRIME (Apr. 10, 2012, 6:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johnwwhitehead/
prisonprivatization_b_1414467.html.
26 Leonard C. Gilroy et al., Public-Private Partnerships for Corrections in California: Bridging the Gap
Between Crisis and Reform, REASON FOUND. & HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYER FOUND., APR. 2011, AT 1, 3–4
(Apr., 2011), http://reason.org/files/private_prisons_california.pdf.
27 Id. at 19.
28 Fleuriet, supra note 5, at 1051.
22
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governments paid these contractors per inmate housed.29 These contractors
generally contracted with states to build prisons with at least 1,000 beds,
maintain an occupancy rate of 90%, for a term of at least twenty-years.30 Thus,
instead of helping reduce the prison population, and cut costs, contractors were
perversely incentivized to house as many inmates as cheaply as possible.31
This avenue would ensure a steady flow of revenue that could be distributed
back to shareholders.
Another area of the justice system that ended up leading to negative results
was the emergence of third-party litigation financing. In this scheme, a thirdparty funds litigation for a share of the eventual recovery.32 There are two
ways potential investors can gain access to award damages: 1) they can
contract with the litigants themselves or 2) they can contract with the litigant’s
attorney to take a percentage of the attorney’s fees.33 The success of these
ventures has attracted the attention of institutional investors such as Swiss
bank, Credit Suisse, and Allianz.34 This practice has given rise to litigation
finance firms whose operations are focused solely on funding legal claims.35
Buford Capital is one of these firms that is publicly traded on the NYSE and
has approximately $500 million worth of assets under management.36 Scholars
argue this form of financing reduces access to justice by encouraging litigants
to bring claims that otherwise may have not been brought without outside
funding.37 However, an investor’s goal to maximize returns on funding legal
claims does not necessarily match-up with the broader legal policy of
improving access to justice.38 The reason here is that investors are more likely
to fund litigation where the existing law advantages plaintiffs.39 Thus, these

29

Id.
Id.
31 Id.
32 Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing 2 (unpublished
article)(on file with the Law & Economic Center of the University of George Mason School of Law), available
at http://www.masonlec.org/site/files/2011/07/Joanna-Shepherd-Final-Draft.pdf.
33 Id.
34 Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is it Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268,
1277 (2010–2011).
35 Shepherd, supra note 32, at 3.
36 Investor Relations, BURFORD, http://www.burfordcapital.com/investor-relations/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2016).
37 Shepherd, supra note 32, at 3.
38 Id.
39 Id.
30
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investors tend to fund claims of corporate litigants who have a significant
chance of obtaining substantial judicial awards.40
As demonstrated in the above sections, private investors are making
significant sums of money off ventures that appear to minimally advance the
interests of justice. This has caused some to feel as though the justice system is
being co-opted for the benefit of big business.41 More importantly, critics feel
this bias renders the system unable to legitimately produce fair and equitable
results. Combine this with the fact that only 31% of Americans believe the
justice system is effective, and it seems very likely that people may look
outside the justice system to solve their disputes.
III. JUSTICE FOR SALE-SECURITIZING THE AREAS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Securitization of government projects through the use of PPPs, combined
with corporate penetration into various aspects of the legal field, makes it
conceivable that the next step in this field is to securitize some of these
ventures. Currently, nothing is stopping a major company like American
Corrections Corp. from issuing securities backed by government leases or
service contracts in the prison industry. Like the CSTR project, investors can
hold bonds secured by income derived from housing inmates. As for litigation
financing, it seems logical that the next step in the industry would be to
securitize potential damage recoveries. Much like mortgage-backed securities,
investors would potentially be able to own tranches of litigation-backed
securities. However, all this runs the risk of further misaligning private and
public interests through complicated security transaction. More issues would
be created for an already flawed justice system. The idea that elements of the
justice system can be bought and traded runs the risk of further distorting
societies’ own sense of justice.
If federal and state governments want to avoid such problems, they need to
better align private and public interest in this area or completely ban the
activity. A start would be to pay private prisons based on performance rather
than volume of prisoners. Furthermore, more must be done to ascertain the
legality of litigation financing because it distinctly hints of claim assignment something prohibited under the law. These preliminary measures may guide

40
41

Id.
Banking on Bondage, supra note 22.
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the future of justice-system investment. To do any less will send a powerful
message to the public that justice is for sale.
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